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Abstract
The purpose of this article is assessing factors that affect Latin Ameri-
can people’s opinions on regional integration. By means of hierarchical 
logistic regressions, variables at both individual and national level were 
considered and fixed and random effects were taken into account. All 
variables included at the individual level, both socio-demographic and 
ideological, were found to be significant factors as well as some cross-
level interactions. Likewise, there is a significant country effect on the 
probability of Latin American people supporting integration. 
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Resumen
Este artículo procura analizar los factores que más influyen en la opin-
ión de los latinoamericanos sobre la integración de la región. Mediante 
regresiones logísticas multinivel, el análisis incluyó variables individu-
ales y nacionales así como efectos fijos y aleatorios. Todas las variables 
analizadas a nivel individual – sociodemográficas e ideológicas – resul-
taron ser indicadores significativos así como algunas interacciones entre 
factores individuales y nacionales. Asimismo, las probabilidades de que 
los latinoamericanos apoyen la integración también indican la presencia 
de un significativo efecto país.
Palabras clave: integración, América Latina, sociedad civil, opinión 
pública, modelo multinivel. 
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Introduction
Over the last four decades, the is-
sue of Latin American and Caribbean 
integration has become relevant and 
largely discussed. This cross-regional 
integration has however failed to be 
implemented and rather priority has 
been assigned to sub-regional or bi-
lateral agreements. This has led to the 
coexistence of a variety of political 
coalitions, trade arrangements and 
sectoral cooperation within the region, 
rather than to the existence of an actual 
continental community.1
1. AEC, ALBA, ALADI,CAN, 
CARICOM, MERCOSUR, 
SICA, UNASUR, among others. 
OTHERS.
Factors that have hindered the re-
alization of an actual “Latin American 
Union”1 are diverse and mainly related 
to the lack of effective community insti-
tutions, the absence of macroeconomic 
coordination and low intra-regional 
trade (Rojas and Altmann, 2006).
Likewise, large asymmetries between 
Latin American countries have been 
quoted as the major obstacle for the 
fulfillment of this integration (Rojas, 
2006). That is, macroeconomic indica-
1 By American Union I refer to a system such 
as the European Union, i.e. a single market 
and common trade policies through a 
standardized system of laws for all mem-
ber states including the free movement of 
citizens, goods, services, and capital as well 
as a monetary union, as proposed and 
developed by Balassa (1962).
tors, economic and political systems, 
employment rates, education, poverty, 
population, ethnic groups, income dis-
tribution, among many other variables, 
differ largely across the region. Hetero-
geneous contexts are observed not only 
between countries but within countries 
themselves. 
On the other hand, some theorists 
have failed to apprehend the integra-
tion process  by reducing it  to a mere 
economic or political phenomenon, 
pointing to the need of including the 
social sphere into its treatment and 
understanding. According to these 
authors, integration is a project that 
is not restricted to political or govern-
mental spheres but includes “another” 
integration, that is produced and re-
produced in large private spaces where 
civil society resides, and therefore more 
inclusive and pluralistic approaches 
become relevant (Rojas, 2006). Oth-
ers (Domínguez, 2003; Grandi, 1997; 
Serbin, 2008) go even further and 
claim that the integration process has 
been characterized by the absence of 
citizenship and a strong democracy 
deficit, with scarce  or null impact of 
civil society on the structuring of the 
regional agenda, either by the direct 
participation or that of their representa-
tives in parliament or congress. 
According to Manenteau-Hor-
ta(1979), including people’s opinions 
and psychology are crucial for assessing 
to what extent these opinions promote 
or block initiatives for unity between 
nations. The author maintains that the 
Latin American integration process 
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has followed a different path, whereby 
governments have focused only in es-
tablishing an economic inter-regional 
interchange whereas public opinion has 
been completely neglected. Although as 
from the 1990s the integration process 
debate has gone beyond the economic 
dimension to include the social dimen-
sion, the latter still requiring further 
elaboration and presence within both 
the political and the academic discus-
sion in Latin America.
Introducing Latin 
Americans’ opinions 
Latin Americans have shown differ-
ent attitudes vis-a-vis integration, and 
although there is major support for 
economic alliances, political unification 
is not as popular (Latinobarometro, 
2009). Movements calling for a more 
“social” integration (Mercosur: Social 
and Supportive, Another Integration is 
Possible, among others. See DelloBuono 
and Avila, 2007; Serbin, 2007, and over 
the last few years there have also been 
demonstrations against potential mul-
tilateral trade agreements - especially in 
sectors such as agriculture, labor unions 
and other social organizations. 
Given these ideas, is Latin American 
integration as proposed by top govern-
ment officials truly a citizen’s aim? If so, 
who supports integration? Who rejects 
it? Which individual factors determine 
why a particular person has a positive 
or negative attitude towards unifica-
tion? On the other hand, heterogeneity 
and asymmetries observed across Latin 
American countries have been men-
tioned as one of the major obstacles for 
implementing integration. Therefore, 
the question would be whether this 
heterogeneity between nations also 
plays a role in opinion on integration. 
Thus, the overarching question to be 
addressed by this article is which fac-
tors - either at the individual, national 
or cross level interaction - strongly 
influence Latin Americans’ opinion 
regarding the economic and political 
integration of the region. 
Latinobarometro´s 2010 Report 
notes “globalization and relations with 
other countries have two dimensions: 
social and political elites of each coun-
try and increasingly the view of citi-
zens” (2010: 29),2and the question on 
the “elitist bias” on regional integration 
processes becomes relevant (Cuatrés 
and Grunberg, 2007:11). Moreover, 
Seligson states that “in democracies, 
public opinion can count a great deal, 
and a strong opposition to integration 
might well spell the end of the regional-
ist movement in Latin America”(1999: 
130). A model to assess civil society´s 
opinion would therefore contribute and 
hopefully reveal new information for 
understanding this slow Latin American 
integration process.
2 Author’s translation.
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Theoretical distinctions 
and previous findings
Taking into account previous find-
ings, at the end of this section I conclude 
that both individual characteristics and 
country features have been found to be 
efficient predictors of attitude towards 
integration across different studies. 
Characteristics at the 
individual level
Within the region, revealing in-
formation can be found in Latino-
barometro’s Reports. This organization 
has tracked Latin American integration 
and public support since 1997 by means 
of univariate-descriptive analysis. The 
2007 report suggests that more than a 
half of Latin Americans agree to either 
economic or political integration. That 
is, 55% support a common parliament, 
51% the elimination of taxes for intra-
regional trade and 44% the free move-
ment of citizens within the region. The 
study also shows the heterogeneity of 
attitudes towards integration. Regard-
ing the abovementioned political and 
economic issues, only 7 countries3 
show percentages above 50% whereas 
another 11 show minor discrepancies 
regarding these issues (Latinobarom-
eter, 2007). 
According to the 2010 report, eco-
nomic integration is supported by a 
majority of Latin American countries 
3 Colombia,DominicanRepublic, El Salva-
dor, México, Nicaragua, Peru and Uruguay.
(71% “somewhat favor” or are “very 
supportive”). This trend, however, dif-
fers across the region, South American 
countries being more supportive than 
those from Central America. Political 
integration, on the other hand, is less 
supported by Latin Americans, with 
a regional average of 59% and more 
variation between countries. Available 
data indicates that support of politi-
cal integration has decreased since the 
study’s first wave in 1997.
Overall, the Report refers to a “bi-
polar trend”, since majorities support 
economic integration, whereas they 
tend to reject political cooperation 
and free movement of individuals (Lat-
inobarometer, 2009). Exceptions are 
Argentineans and Brazilians, who dis-
play a more positive attitude towards 
political integration. Both countries 
have been leading and promoting the 
regional integrationist project during 
the last decades, hence these ideas may 
have been more accepted by citizens 
(Latinobarometro, 2010). The latter 
shows the influence of the country con-
text on supporting integration. 
In terms of individual characteris-
tics, women (56%) and groups in lower 
socio-economic (64%) and educational 
levels (66%) tend to be less supportive 
of economic integration. According to 
this descriptive study, Latin American 
most excluded and least skilled groups 
tend to view regional integration less 
confidently. 
Apart from studies conducted by 
Latinobarometro, Latin Americans’ 
support of integration has not been 
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substantially explored, especially in 
terms of multivariate analysis. An ex-
ception is a study by Seligson (1999) 
that focuses on individual-level factors 
as predictors of economic integration. 
The author concludes that “perceived 
benefits of integration” and “percep-
tion of personal and national economic 
situation” are important factors as well 
as socio-demographic variables such as 
gender and educational level. Confirm-
ing Latinobarometro’s findings, gender 
and educational level have a significant 
effect on displaying a supportive or 
non-supportive stand on integration.
As to conclusions of Latinobaromet-
ro and Seligson for the Latin-American 
context, Anderson and Reichert (1996) 
and Gabel and Palmer (1995) show that 
citizens with low levels of competitive 
advantages (education and occupation-
al skills) are likely to be negatively pre-
disposed towards the European Union. 
On the other hand, studies carried out 
for the North American integrationist 
project (NAFTA) suggest that people 
made up their minds in this respect on 
the basis of arguments about trade and 
not about their own self-interest, sug-
gesting that there might be a “rational 
public” at the individual level (Uslander, 
1998:341). In a different study (Me-
rolla et al., 2005), economic variables 
were tested and results show that in 
the United States and Canada more 
skilled individuals support NAFTA, 
whereas no significant effect was found 
for Mexican public opinion. Expected 
economic benefits and other utilitarian 
variables have been often pointed out 
as important factors in the opinion on 
integration and several scholars have 
concentrated their attention on these 
variables. Nevertheless, as suggested 
by Merolla and her colleagues, non-
economic interests or variables such as 
nationalism were found to substantially 
influence opinions on NAFTA, to the 
point of canceling out the effects of 
economic interests.
The latter argument is also sup-
ported by Hooge and Marks (2004). 
The authors postulate that economic 
interest variables account for 15% of 
total variance in public opinion regard-
ing the European Union but the influ-
ence of these factors is overshadowed 
by identity variables, i.e. exclusive 
national identity, multiculturalism, and 
national attachment. Together, these 
variables explain 20.8% of support for 
the European Union. According to these 
scholars, most researchers have con-
ceptualized European integration as an 
economic phenomenon, and therefore 
considered public opinion as a function 
of the distributional consequences of 
market liberalization. Nonetheless, the 
European Union is also a supranational 
polity with extensive authority over 
those living in its territory. It is hence 
plausible that European integration 
engages group, and above all, national 
identities. 
Carey (2002), on the other hand, 
shows that national attachment, to-
gether with national pride have a sig-
nificant negative effect on support for 
European integration. National identity 
has also been identified as a constraint 
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on this support in other studies of the 
European Union (Christin and Trech-
sel, 2002; Gutierrez and Medrano, 
2001). Other studies, however, have 
recognized strong national attachment 
as being positively related to the desire 
for further European integration (Cit-
rinand Sides, 2004; Risse, 2002). 
The importance of economic and 
non-economic interest variables is also 
found in the study by Gabel (1998a). 
Through regression analyses of Euro-
barometer surveys covering 1978-1992, 
the author tests individual-level theories 
of public support for European integra-
tion showing that both partisanship as 
well as the economic benefits expected 
from European integration are signifi-
cant factors. The partisan context has 
also been studied by Inglehart, Rabier, 
and Reif (1991) who find that support-
ers of leftist parties were less favorable 
toward integration than those of right-
wing parties. They attributed this differ-
ence to the standpoint of the relevant 
parties on European integration. 
Country level or 
contextual characteristics
Along with individual level vari-
ables, country characteristics have 
drawn the attention of researchers for 
explaining public opinion on the Eu-
ropean Community. Studies performed 
by Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) and 
Gabel and Palmer (1995) suggest that 
citizen support for European integra-
tion is constantly influenced by a com-
bination of domestic and international 
factors. National economic conditions 
and national governments affect evalu-
ations of supranational institutions. 
Equally important, results show that 
international economic and political 
factors are critical influences on citizen 
support for the European Community.
Likewise, other studies have focused 
on these indirect political and economic 
factors for supporting the European 
Union. Some researchers found a sig-
nificant, though weak negative relation-
ship between public support for inte-
gration and inflation or unemployment, 
and a weak positive effect of economic 
growth (Anderson and Kaltenthaler, 
1996; Bednar, Ferejohn, and Garrett, 
1996; Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993). 
Other studies, on the contrary, found 
no significant relation between these 
national variables and citizens’ sup-
port for European Union integration 
(Anderson and Reichert, 1995; Gabel 
and Whitten, 1997). 
Relevant for the current research 
are Brinegar and Jolly’s (2005) find-
ings. As aforementioned, lower-skilled 
groups are likely to evaluate integration 
more negatively. The authors, however, 
argue that skill levels matter but they 
can only be understood in the frame-
work of national factor endowments 
and varieties of capitalism, specifically 
skill endowment and welfare state type. 
They suggest that other individual-level 
factors, such as ideology, are condi-
tioned or tempered by each country’s 
political-economic institutions and 
other national contextual influences. 
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They also indicate that on carrying out 
integration analyses cross-level interac-
tions must be taken into account. The 
authors observed a strengthening of 
effects in individual-level interactions 
when cross-level interactions are con-
sidered. They suggest shifting the de-
bate in favor of studies supporting the 
European Union into cross-level inter-
actions in a hierarchical model so as to 
allow a deeper exploration of linkages 
between individual- and national-level 
factors, especially when studying educa-
tion and ideological variables (see also 
Gabel, 1998b; Eichenberg and Dalton, 
2007; and Jacquier, 2012). 
A multi-level model for 
assessing support of Latin 
American integration
Bearing in mind the above findings, 
both individual characteristics and 
country features have been found to be 
effective indicators of attitudes towards 
integration across different studies. 
Hence, this article purports to examine 
which of these characteristics are the 
most effective predictors of support 
for Latin American integration. At the 
individual level, socio-demographics 
(age, gender, educational level, personal 
economic situation) and ideological 
variables (political leanings and na-
tional pride) are included. Following 
Brinegar and Jolly’s (2005) findings, 
skill endowment is considered a factor 
at the country level. Since, as opposed 
to Europe, in the Latin American 
context it is not possible to observe 
welfare systems, income distribution 
inequality is considered as a measure 
of welfare and incorporated in the 
current analysis. Likewise, differences 
across Latin American countries (espe-
cially regarding economic and political 
systems) have been mentioned as an 
important constraint for the fulfillment 
of regional integration. For this reason, 
I also assess to what extent support of 
integration at the individual level is 
affected by differences between coun-
tries, i.e. people’s location or country 
effect is taken into account. Finally, I 
analyze whether these individual fac-
tors behave differently across national 
characteristics, that is, to what extent 
cross-level interaction affects public 
opinion. According to the abovemen-
tioned theories, significant interaction 
between country level variables and 
education and ideological variables are 
expected to be found. 
Latinobarometro’s database was 
used for carrying out this study. The 
sample for its 2009 Survey was de-
signed to ensure a sampling error of 
3%, with a 95% confidence interval. 
Face to face interviews (n=20.204) 
were applied to adults4 across 18 
Latin American countries5 within rep-
resentative samples. For country-level 
4 18+ years old, except Brazil and Nicaragua 
16+ years old.
5 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Costa Rica, DominicanRepublic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hondu-
ras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Para-
guay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
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variables, on the other hand, data from 
both the Statistical Yearbook 2010 of 
the Economic Commission for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 
and the Socio-Economic Database 
for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(CEDLAS and The World Bank) (SED-
LAC) were utilized. 
According to the revised literature 
and research objectives, a two-level 
model with a set of independent vari-
ables and two dependent variables 
was defined. As individual level vari-
ables two groups are distinguished: 
socio-demographics and ideological .6 
The two dependent variables are two 
dichotomous variables: questions refer 
to individuals’ opinion on economic 
integration and the region’s political 
integration expressed in agreement or 
disagreement. As mentioned earlier, 
the two country level variables are 
“skill endowment” and “inequality of 
income distribution”. For income dis-
tribution, the Gini coefficient7was used 
as a measure of distribution inequal-
ity in each country. In addition, some 
cross-level interactions were expected 
to be significant. A multiplying effect 
between country-level variables – skill 
endowment and income distribution 
6 As socio-demographic factors I have in-
cluded: age, gender, education level , and 
personal economic situation. What pre-
vious findings on European context indi-
cated to be effective indicators were inclu-
ded as ideological variables, i.e. nationa-
lism or national pride and political ten-
dency.
7 A value of 0 expresses total equality and 
a value of 1 maximal inequality.
(Gini coefficient) - and individual-level 
variables - ideological and education - 
were assessed in the following analysis.
Given the measurement level of the 
variables and objectives of this research, 
the procedure for data analysis is a lo-
gistic regression. This technique enables 
ranking the relative importance of inde-
pendents, assessing interaction effects, 
and understanding the impact of covari-
ate control variables, usually explained 
in terms of odds ratios (Garson, 2007). 
The current research problem also 
presents a hierarchical structure. Multi-
level analysis models the structure and 
provides estimations of variability of 
regression coefficients across different 
contexts, i.e. allows an analysis of both 
between group and within group vari-
ability. Using this technique it is pos-
sible to analyze both micro and macro 
levels and hence avoiding the atomistic 
or ecological fallacies.
Thus, considering the data’s strict 
hierarchical structure and the measure-
ment level of the variables, the analysis 
is based on a Hierarchical Logistic 
Regression or Logistic Multilevel Re-
gression. The model considers that the 
dichotomous (0,1) or binary depend-
ent variable Yij follows a Bernoulli 
distribution (Hox, 2010)Yij ~ Bernoulli 
(1, πij) with a conditional variance var 
(Yij |πij) = πij (1-πij) where πij is the prob-
ability for individual i of presenting 
the characteristic of interest, i.e. πij = 
Pr(Yij=1) or being in favor of economic 
and political integration, in country j. 
Consequently, at the single level the 
model is defined as:
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where X'ij refers to the vector of 
explanatory variables. Coefficient ß0 
represents the model constant and the 
vector ß1=(ß11, ß12,…, ß1k) includes the k 
coefficients of the covariates. The equa-
tion does not include the lowest-level 
residual variance because it is part of 
the specification of the error distribu-
tion. When the latter is binomial, the 
variance is a function of the popula-
tion proportion and it is not estimated 
separately (Hox, 2010).
When incorporating the country 
level into the model to assess the 
national context over the dependent 
variable, the constant of the model is 
allowed to vary across countries. The 
logit multilevel model: 
where ß0 is the mean of the con-
stant for the total population. It is the 
random effect of the model which is 
normally distributed with mean 0 and 
variance and shows the difference at-
tributed to country. Since the logit mul-
tilevel equation represents the log odd of 
experiencing an event, the exponentiated 
parameters of the model are interpreted 
in terms of Odd Ratios (OR). 
To estimate the multilevel model, 
the MLwin 2.23 program was used. In 
order to compute the parameters of a 
generalized linear model the maximum 
likelihood method was utilized. Nev-
ertheless, when a multilevel structure 
is taken into account a more complex 
estimation procedure arises. To deal 
with this problem, MLwin uses the 
quasi-likelihood method which trans-
forms a discrete response model into 
a continuous. After this linearization, 
the model is estimated using iterative 
generalized least squares (IGLS) or 
restricted IGLS (RIGLS). The lineariza-
tion method requires using an approxi-
mation. MLwin provides a marginal 
quasi-likelihood (MQL) and penalized 
(or predictive) quasi-likelihood (PQL) 
and both methods include either 1st 
order or 2nd order terms of the Taylor 
series expansion (Rasbashet al., 2004).
Main findings
All covariates included in the model 
were found to be significant in the bi-
variate analysis carried out before the 
multilevel modeling. The Wald test8 was 
used to determine the significance of 
each model as a whole, as well as the 
significance of coefficients. 
The method of analysis was step-
wise. As Rasbashet et al. (2004) sug-
gest, the most sensible way of fitting 
8 The Wald test contrasts the null hypoth-
esis that parameters (fixed or random) are 
significantly different from zero in the 
population. This value follows a Chi-
square distribution with the correspondent 
number of degrees of freedom (Twisk, 
2006).
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a multilevel model is to start with the 
basic components and then building 
up models of increasing complexity by 
adding indicators and checking signifi-
cance. The sequential modeling started 
with the null model, and then predictors 
were added according to blocks defined 
in the theoretical section: sociodemo-
graphics, ideological, ecological and 
finally, the interaction terms for both 
dependent variables. 
The intercept-only model (null mod-
el) was used to predict the probability 
of being in favor of Latin American 
economic and political integration; 
it assesses to what extent individual 
opinion varies across countries, one of 
the issues approached in this research. 
This is done comparing the single-level 
intercept with the random intercept, i.e. 
fixed effect versus random effect. 
The estimate of the single-level mod-
el for the ratio of supporting economic 
integration vis-à-vis not supporting 
it equals exp(1.621) = 5.06, which is 
simply the same sample ratio between 
supporters and non-supporters, mean-
ing that the odds of supporting are 5 
times larger than opposing integration 
(see Table 1). The parameter’s sig-
nificance (p<0.01) was derived from 
the Wald test. When the same ratio is 
analyzed for political integration, the 
odds for supporting are lower, that is, 
the odds of being in favor are 2.5 times 
higher compared to being against it at 
a significant level.
As can be seen in Table 1, the log-
odds of supporting integration account 
for multilevel structure. When the inter-
cept is allowed to vary randomly across 
countries, the general intercept for 
country j is estimated: 1.721 + , where 
the variance of - or the between-country 
variance in the log-odds of support-
ing integration - is estimated as 0.321 
(SE=0.110), which is significant at 1% 
level.9 Hence, differences between Latin 
American countries are significant.
When country effect is taken into ac-
count, the expected log-odds of support 
for economic integration are 1.721 (on 
average across all Latin American in-
dividuals across all countries) equal to 
odds of exp(1.721) = 5.59. Applying the 
logistic transformation , it corresponds 
to a predicted probability of 1/(1+exp(-
1.721)) = 0.85, i.e. 85% probabilities 
of an “average” country supporting 
economic integration. As for political 
integration, on the other hand, the same 
grand mean of expected probabilities 
for the 18 countries equals 72%. 
9 The Wald test statistic for the random ef-
fect is with 1 degree of freedom
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Assuming countries’ log-odds of 
support to be approximately normally 
distributed with a mean of 1.721 and 
a variance of 0.321 in the case of eco-
nomic support, the 95% confidence 
interval for equals [. Converting these 
log-odds into predicted probabilities, 
the 95% confidence intervals (CI) are 
(0.94, 0.65), meaning that although 
the probability of supporting econo-
mic integration is 85% percent for all 
Latin-American countries, probabilities 
between countries vary significantly 
since when random effects are consi-
dered and the model does not include 
predictors, support varies between 65 
and 94%. 
Due to the multilevel structure, va-
riation between and within countries 
can be computed. In the case of political 
integration, probabilities of variation 
range between 54 and 85%. Likewise, 
within group or cluster average variabi-
lity equals, i.e. the average probabilities 
of being in favor of political integration 
vary between 67 and 75% within one 
country. 
In order to examine estimates of 
country effects obtained from the null 
model, caterpillar plots ranking country 
effects and 95% confidence intervals 
and the log-odds scale (see Figure 1). 
The dotted line at zero represents the 
mean log-odds for supporting economic 
integration across all countries. A coun-
try whose confidence interval does not 
overlap the line at zero is said to differ 
significantly from the average at the 
Parameter Estimate
Fixed Effect Intercept (at level 1)
Economic Integration 1.621 (0.021)***
Political Integration 0.918 (0.017)***
Fixed Effect Intercept (at level 2)
Economic Integration 1.721 (0.136)***
Political Integration 0.942 (0.098)***
Random Effect 
Economic Integration 0.321 (0.110)***
Political Integration 0.167 (0.057)***
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Table 1. Parameters and standard errors of an intercept-only calculating the probability of 
supporting Latin-American integration (S.E.s are placed in parentheses).
47
Camila Jara Ibarra • Public support for Latin American integration: a model to assess...
5% level (Steele, 2008). Although in the 
case of political integration countries 
lean more towards the mean log-odds 
line, it is still possible to identify some 
outliers that coincide with findings of 
earlier studies: the three triangles to the 
right and above the line are Argentina, 
Brazil and Uruguay, who have been 
leading and promoting the regional 
integrationist project.
Figure 1. Caterpillar plot showing 
country residuals with 95% confidence 
intervals for log-odds of supporting 
integration
a) Economic Integration
b) Political Integration
Another important element pro-
vided by the null model for assessing 
the country effect on opinion is the 
intraclass correlation or the variance 
partition coefficient (VPC).10 Assuming 
normally distributed random-effects, 
the estimated intraclass correlation 
equals , given that in the logistic regres-
sion formula errors11 are assumed to 
follow a standard logistic distribution 
with mean 0 and variance (Hedeker, 
2007). Hence, the intraclass correla-
tion for the null model for supporting 
economic integration and political in-
tegration , i.e. the correlation between 
individuals within a country is 9% and 
5% for both models. In other words, 
between 5 and 10% of the residual 
variance of supporting economic and 
political integration can be attributable 
to differences between countries. This 
analysis allows assessing that varia-
tion occurs at both the individual and 
national levels. 
As stated earlier, in order to build the 
model a blockwise procedure was used, 
starting with the sociodemographic 
variables, followed by the ideological 
variables and finally including ecologi-
cal variables. The Gini coefficient and 
skill endowment were centered around 
their mean and as for the interaction 
terms, the same aforementioned cat-
egories were used as references for 
10 The VPC for a two level random intercept 
model is the proportion of total residual 
variance which is attributable to level 2, 
i.e. , that can be interpreted as the correla-
tion between two level 1 units in the same 
higher level unit (Rasbashet al.,2004)
11 If the error distribution is binomial, the 
variance is a function of a population 
proportion and it does not have to be es-
timated separately in the regression equa-
tion.
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individual variables. Tables 2 and 3 
present results of models 2 to 5, which 
include covariate parameters. 
The last model is Model 5, wherein 
indicators are interpreted by means of 
exponentiated parameters. Thus, is read 
as the multiplying effect on the odds of 
the dependent variable for a 1-unit in-
crease in . If is binary then is interpreted 
as the odds ratio, comparing the odds 
for units with relative to odds for units 
where (Rasbashet al.,2004). 
Firstly, taking into account only the 
main effects, the constant of the model 
can be read as the mean probability of 
supporting economic integration across 
all countries of the reference profile, i.e. 
the probability - for a 40 years old Latin 
American woman in bad economic cir-
cumstances and primary education who 
declares being proud of her country and 
right wing political leanings - of agree-
ing to economic integration is 0.75 
and 0.61 for political unification. This 
woman also lives in an average country 
in terms of the Gini index (0.519) and 
her skill endowment equals 8.4 years of 
schooling. The exponentiated parame-
ter for men exp(0.090)=1.09 shows that 
the odds for men are 10 % higher than 
women. Likewise, the probability12 of 
men supporting economic integration is 
76 % (1/1+exp(-(1.088+0.090) whereas 
for women it is 75%. Thus, although 
the effect of gender is significant, prob-
abilities of supporting integration are 
fairly similar. As for political integra-
tion, gender difference is higher: the 
odds of men having a positive opinion 
are 1.21 times higher than for women. 
12 Cluster-specific probability 
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Support for economicIntegration = 1
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
FixedPart
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Cons 1.232    (0.142)*** 1.065    (0.148)*** 1.085    (0.153)*** 1.088    (0.155)***
Men 0.094    (0.043)** 0.091    (0.043)** 0.092    (0.043)*** 0.090    (0.043)***
(age-40) 0.002    (0.001) 0.002    (0.001) 0.002    (0.001) 0.002    (0.001)
About average 0.386    (0.053)*** 0.383    (0.053)*** 0.384    (0.053)*** 0.369    (0.053)***
Good 0.609    (0.065)*** 0.603    (0.066)*** 0.604    (0.066)*** 0.576    (0.066)***
Secondary 0.077    (0.051) 0.073    (0.051) 0.071    (0.051) 0.069    (0.052)
Higher 0.397    (0.067)*** 0.391    (0.067)*** 0.390    (0.067)*** 0.379    (0.068)***
Not proud 0.176    (0.043)*** 0.177    (0.043)*** 0.189    (0.044)***
None 0.046    (0.062) 0.046    (0.062) 0.079    (0.063)
Left 0.139    (0.060)*** 0.140    (0.060)*** 0.136    (0.061)***
Center 0.176    (0.059)*** 0.177    (0.059)*** 0.191    (0.060)***
(gini-0.519) 0.078    (3.087) 2.510    (3.310)
(skill endow-8.4) 0.099    (0.096) 0.071    (0.104)
(sk.end-8.4).Not proud 0.073    (0.033)***
(sk.end-8.4).None 0.095    (0.048)***
(sk.end-8.4).Left -0.126    (0.045)***
(sk.end-8.4).Center -0.027    (0.046)
(gini-0.519). Not proud -2.184    (0.980)***
(gini-0.519).None -1.052    (1.393)
(gini-0.519).Left -8.569    (1.329)***
(gini-0.519).Center -1.867    (1.309)
(gini-0.519).Secondary 2.839    (1.142)***
(gini-0.519).Higher 1.946    (1.502)
(sk.end-8.4).Secondary 0.002    (0.039)
(sk.end-8.4).Higher 0.067    (0.056)
Random part 
0.313    (0.108)*** 0.317   (0.109)*** 0.338    (0.116)*** 0.349    (0.119)***
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level
Table 2. Parameters and standard errors of parameters predicting the probability  
of supporting Latin-American economic integration (S.E. in parentheses)
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Table 3. Parameters and standard errors of parameters predicting the probability of suppor-
ting Latin-American political integration (S.E.s are placed in parentheses)
Support for political integration = 1 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Fixed part
Cons 0.504   (0.101)*** 0.435   (0.106)*** 0.454   (0.099)*** 0.461   (0.099)***
Man 0.134   (0.035)*** 0.124   (0.036)*** 0.124   (0.036)*** 0.119   (0.036)***
(age-40) 0.002   (0.001) 0.002   (0.001) 0.002   (0.001) 0.002   (0.001)
About average 0.366   (0.045)*** 0.362   (0.045)*** 0.360   (0.045)*** 0.346   (0.046)***
Good 0.454   (0.054)*** 0.441   (0.054)*** 0.439   (0.054)*** 0.422   (0.054)***
Secondary 0.075   (0.042)* 0.069   (0.042) 0.064   (0.043) 0.055   (0.043)
Higher 0.204   (0.053)** 0.197   (0.053)*** 0.192   (0.053)*** 0.190   (0.054)***
Not proud 0.111   (0.036)*** 0.110   (0.036)*** 0.104   (0.036)***
None -0.098   (0.051)* -0.100   (0.051)* -0.075   (0.052)
Left 0.174   (0.050)*** 0.174   (0.050)*** 0.186   (0.050)***
Center 0.022   (0.048) 0.021   (0.048) 0.040   (0.049)
(gini-0.519) -0.527   (1.846) 3.110   (2.034)
(skill endow-8.4) 0.121   (0.058)** 0.150   (0.064)**
(gini-0.519).Not proud -1.494   (0.794)*
(gini-0.519).None -3.809   (1.157)***
(gini-0.519). Left -7.625   (1.069)***
(gini-0.519). Center -1.197   (1.050)
(gini-0.519). Secondary 0.551   (0.918)
(gini-0.519). Higher -0.766   (1.166)
(skill endow-8.4).Not-
Proud -0.020   (0.026)
(skill endow-8.4).None 0.023   (0.037)
(skill endow-8.4).Left -0.041   (0.035)
(skill endow-8.4).
Center 0.015   (0.036)
(skill endow-8.4).Sec-
ondary -0.024   (0.030)
(skill endow-8.4).
Higher -0.063   (0.041)
Random part 
  0.145   (0.050)*** 0.146   (0.051)*** 0.119   (0.042)*** 0.117   (0.041)***
Notes: *** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level 
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Personal economic situation turns 
out to be an effective indicator. The 
expected probability differs 9% to 
84% versus 75% in the case of higher 
economic level respondents. The same 
is observed in opinion regarding po-
litical integration where the odds of 
supporting integration for individuals 
with a good economic position are 53% 
higher than in those whose position is 
less favorable. Figure 2 represents prob-
abilities of personal economic situation 
and 95% confidence intervals. 
Figure 2. Predicted population 
average probabilities for categories of 
personal economic situation
Using the random-intercept model, 
95% confidence intervals for the 
country level are calculated for the 
different economic categories. While 
the average probability of supporting 
economic integration of a person with 
a good economic situation is 0.84, 
this probability varies widely between 
countries, going from 0.60 to 0.94. 
This appears more marked in the case 
of bad economic situation respondents 
where the average 75% probabilities 
of favoring integration goes from 46 
to 90% when the analysis is extended 
to country-level. The same is observed 
regarding opinion on political integra-
tion, where the average probability 
of support of a person with a good 
economic situation is 0.71, although 
across countries this value varies from 
0.55 to 0.83.
Likewise, the average probability 
of supporting economic integration 
of respondents with higher education 
equals 81%. Compared to primary 
education, the odds for a more skilled 
 a) Support economic integration           b) Support political integration
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person are 46% higher (1.46), and 
predicted probabilities for less skilled 
respondents reaches 75%. The 95% 
confidence interval for higher education 
can also be estimated ( = (1.28, 1.67), 
where the relevant within cluster odds 
ratio differs significantly from 1, that 
is, the value of 1 or below that reflects 
no relationship does not lie within the 
interval (Twisk, 2006). When educa-
tional level is analyzed as an indicator 
for opinion on political integration, it is 
observed that the odds for respondents 
with higher education is 1.21 times 
those of a person with primary educa-
tion, which is lower than the effect on 
support for economic integration. Al-
though the odds ratio of secondary and 
primary education is not significant for 
both dependent variables, the difference 
between secondary and higher educa-
tion was tested obtaining significant 
results.13The latter suggests that the 
most important difference of support 
for integration between categories of 
education is that between the most 
educated respondents compared to 
both primary and secondary catego-
ries. Hence, the interpretation of this 
relation is done in terms of generalized 
odds ratios. The odds of supporting 
economic integration for the most edu-
cated respondents versus the average 
13 A test for the significance of differences 
was carried out finding that the difference 
for higher and secondary education was 
significant with chi-square statistic of 
20.738 (in support for economic integra-
tion) and 6.346 (in support for economic 
integration) with 1 degree of freedom.
of primary and secondary education is 
times higher in most skilled individuals. 
Up to now, more educated, higher 
socio-economic level individuals are 
most supportive of integration, prob-
ably because they consider it as an 
opportunity of moving across the re-
gion looking for educational or work 
prospects. Less competitive groups in 
terms of labor market, namely women 
and less educated persons, are more 
skeptical regarding such integration.
When ideological variables are 
analyzed, Latin Americans who declare 
being proud of his/her country show a 
lower probability of supporting eco-
nomic and political integration than 
those not proud of their country, being 
a significant indicator of opinion with 
regard to both economic and political 
integration. Across the 18 analyzed 
countries, average probabilities of 
supporting economic integration are 
78 % in the case of those who are not 
proud of their country and 75% for 
respondents expressing pride of their 
country, when controlling for all other 
variables included in the model. As for 
support of political integration, the 
odds for not proud respondents are 
21 % higher than those who declare 
being proud of their country. In terms 
of political preference, center tendency 
respondents agree most with economic 
integration when compared to right 
wing respondents (odds 1.21 times 
higher) whereas compared to leftist 
individuals, odds of agreeing are more 
or less similar. The odds ratio for left 
wing versus right wing respondents are 
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15 % higher. When the second level 
variation is taken into account, prob-
abilities of supporting integration of 
left wing adherent vary widely, rang-
ing from 0.527 to 0.912, depending 
on the country. The latter variation is 
similar for other political affiliation 
categories examined across countries. 
As for support for political integration, 
only left wing is found to be significant 
compared to the right wing category. 
Nevertheless, and going further into 
the analysis, the left wing category pre-
sents a significant difference with both 
center and none categories (8.073 and 
22.973 chi-square statistic respectively 
with 1 degree of freedom). The same 
is observed for the difference between 
center and no tendency categories (chi-
square statistic 4.806 with 1 degree of 
freedom). 
Both higher-level variables were 
found not significant in explaining 
opinion on economic integration and 
only skill endowment had an important 
effect on support for political integra-
tion. The parameter for skill endow-
ment shows that a one year increase 
in the average years of education of a 
country’s labor force has an incremen-
tal effect on the odds of agreeing with 
integration in an individual’s response. 
On the other hand, the Gini index’s ef-
fect shows that the more unequal the 
income distribution in a country the 
higher the probabilities of supporting 
integration among those living in that 
country. 
Cross-level interactions included in 
the model offer substantial information. 
In order to facilitate interpretation of 
the results, three characteristic values 
of the uncentered ecological variables 
were calculated and related to the ideo-
logical and educational individual-level 
indicators. 
Observing the effect of both na-
tional pride and country level variables, 
it can be seen that these effects are sig-
nificant at 1% level for the opinion on 
economic integration; the multiplying 
effect of the Gini index and national 
pride is also significant for supporting 
political integration. The interaction 
term between skill endowment and 
national pride is positive on the odds 
of supporting economic integration. 
For both categories of national pride, 
probabilities of support increase when 
values of skill endowment are higher, 
but the trend is more pronounced in the 
not proud category (the line is steeper, 
as seen in Figure 3). As can be observed 
at the plot axis in Figure 3, the lowest 
and highest characteristic values of skill 
endowment (SE) are 6.890 and 9.258 
respectively. For countries whose SE 
equals 9.258, probabilities of support-
ing integration of those proud of his/
her country are 0.76, whereas those not 
proud they are 0.80. In terms of odds 
ratios, the odds for supporting eco-
nomic integration in a country with the 
most skilled labor force are 1.29 times 
higher for those who are not proud of 
the country versus those who are proud. 
On the other hand, in countries with a 
less skilled labor force (SE=6.890) the 
odds ratio equals 1.09, that is, odds 
are more or less similar for supporting 
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economic integration. The graphical 
representation of this interaction term 
shows a “fanning out” tendency, that is, 
the range of probabilities of supporting 
integration is narrower (roughly the 
same) for national pride in countries 
where labor force is less skilled. 
Figure 3. Interaction effect of skill 
endowment and national pride on sup-
port for economic integration
A “fanning in” tendency, on the 
other hand, is observed for the interac-
tion term of national pride and income 
distribution. There is an effect of na-
tional pride on the odds of supporting 
integration which show a wider gap in 
countries with a lower Gini coefficient, 
i.e. in countries with a more equal 
income distribution. The odds for not 
proud versus proud of their country in 
more equally distributed countries is 31 
% higher, whereas within more unequal 
countries this ratio is 10% for support-
ing economic integration. 
In countries with an average income 
distribution (Gini coefficient=0.519) 
odds of supporting economic integra-
tion are 1.21 times higher for respond-
ents who are not proud of their country 
versus those who are proud of it. This 
ratio equals 1.11 in the case of political 
integration. Finally, in most unequal 
countries, the odds for supporting 
economic and political integration are 
more or less similar for proud and not 
proud respondents. 
While national pride is an efficient 
factor at individual level, when com-
bined with a country level variable the 
effect is more pronounced in countries 
where income is more equally dis-
tributed and labor force more skilled. 
As seen in Figure 4, probabilities of 
supporting integration of respondents 
who are not proud of their country do 
not change significantly if the country 
is more equal or unequal in terms of 
income distribution. In contrast, for 
those respondents who are proud of 
their country, probabilities increase 
more strongly when countries become 
more unequal. 
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Figure 4. Interaction effect of in-
come distribution and national pride 
in support for economic and political 
integration
Observing the interaction term of 
political affiliation and skill endow-
ment shown in Figure 5, it can be 
seen that in none and left preferences, 
the significant terms present a con-
trasting tendency when considering 
skill endowment. In countries with 
a more skilled labor force, left wing 
individuals have lower probabilities of 
supporting economic integration than 
left wing respondents from less skilled 
labor force countries. Similarly, odds 
for supporting economic integration 
of left wing compared to right wing 
respondents are the same (odds=1.00) 
in countries with the most skilled labor 
force, whereas odds for supporting 
economic integration for left wing 
compared to right wing category are 
1.38 times higher in countries with 
least skilled labor force.
For the no political tendency, on the 
other hand, an increasingly steep line 
is observed, meaning that in countries 
with less skilled labor force, respond-
ents without political preference are 
less likely to support integration, while 
in countries with a more skilled labor 
force respondents with no political 
preference are more supportive of re-
gional economic integration. 
 a) Support economic integration           b) Support political integration
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Figure 5. Interaction effect of skill 
endowment and political tendency on 
support for economic integration
Combining the Gini coefficient 
with educational level (see Figure 6) 
turns out to be a significant indicator 
of support for economic integration. 
The positive effect can be interpreted 
as the more unequal the country, the 
higher the probabilities of supporting 
economic integration for the three cat-
egories of education across countries. 
In countries where income is more 
equally distributed (Gini index=0.480) 
predicted probabilities of supporting 
economic integration for primary/
illiterate, secondary and higher educa-
tion categories are 0.73, 0.72 and 0.78, 
respectively. In terms of probabilities 
based on the reference category, prob-
abilities of supporting integration in a 
more equally distributed country are 
higher in individuals with a higher 
educational level (0.57) and lower for 
respondents with secondary education 
(0.48) compared to the primary cat-
egory (0.50). 
However, for secondary versus pri-
mary education when examining more 
unequally distributed countries the op-
posite trend prevails. That is, the odds 
of supporting economic integration 
for the secondary education category 
are 1.21 times higher, and for higher 
education category is 1.58 times higher, 
when both groups are compared to the 
reference category (primary). 
Figure 6. Interaction effect of in-
come distribution and education on 
support for economic integration
On the other hand, when political 
preferences are taken into account, 
probabilities of supporting both eco-
nomic and political integration show an 
57
Camila Jara Ibarra • Public support for Latin American integration: a model to assess...
opposite trend for left wing respondents 
compared to right and center political 
preferences depending on the coun-
try’s income distribution. As seen in 
Figure 7, in countries where income is 
more equally distributed, the odds for 
supporting integration for left wing 
compared to right wing respondents 
are 1.59 times higher. In contrast, when 
the same odds ratio is analyzed within 
countries with the most unequally dis-
tributed income, the odds of support-
ing economic integration for left wing 
individuals are 0.81 times higher (19 
percent times lower) than right wing 
respondents. 
Figure 7. Interaction effect of in-
come distribution and political prefer-
ence on support for integration
Overall, countries with more un-
equal income distribution have higher 
probabilities of supporting integration, 
but the opposite applies for leftist re-
spondents. Compared to right wing 
individuals, the odds for supporting 
political integration for left wing re-
spondents from more equally distrib-
uted countries are 1.62 times higher. 
In countries where income is more 
asymmetrically distributed, the odds of 
agreeing with political unification are 
0.80 times lower for left wing than for 
right wing respondents. 
 a) Support economic integration           b) Support political integration
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Conclusions
Factors affecting public support 
for regional integration have been as-
sessed by means of statistical analysis, 
finding results consistent with those of 
earlier studies. Findings also indicate 
that when carrying studies on public 
opinion in Latin America, cross-level in-
teraction should be taken into account. 
Results show that public opinion is 
a complex, multidimensional problem 
and atomistic or ecological fallacies 
may be avoided by bringing into the 
analysis the complexity and multiple 
levels of reality. The study proposes an 
analytical model which broadens the 
debate on Latin American issues by 
including linkages between countries’ 
structures and individuals, assessing the 
relation of the countries’ structure and 
individual characteristics and citizens’ 
opinions and decisions. 
Finally, this paper incorporates the 
problem of Latin American integra-
tion from the citizens’ standpoint and 
characteristics. Rather ignored by the 
debate on regional integration, the civil 
society has an important role to play 
in the process. Although integration 
has been proposed first and foremost 
by the economic and political elites of 
each country, in the long run those who 
will be daily living and experiencing 
integration shall be citizens, hence the 
success or failure of the process will 
depend on support for integration by 
the Latin American people. 
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